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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRASHER MOTOR AND FINANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
RICHARD A. BROWN and JACQUELINE

Case No.
11,601

A. BROWN, partners, dba B & C COM-

P ANY, a partnership,

Defendants-Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Suite for replevin of motor vehicles held by Defendants on trust receipt and counterclaim for usury, funds
due for purchase of an automobile, for an accounting,
breach of contract, etc.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Court on its own motion diismissed the complaint and
counterclaim for failure of both parties to prosecute the
action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an order vacating the order dismissing
the counterclaim and permitting it to proceed to trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The sequence of events involving this matter are as
follows:
7-22-63 Plaintiff filed complaint (R. 2)
8-21-63 Defendants filed answer and counterclaim
(R. 19)
8-30-63 Plaintiff filed motion to strike counterclaim
(R. 20)
1-13-69 Defendant filed notice of readiness for trial
(R. 28)
1-20-69 Plaintiff filed objections to notice of readiness for trial (R. 22)
3-10-69 Plaintiff filed motion to strike defenses
(R. 24)
3-10-69 Plaintiff filed amended motion to strike
counterclaim (R. 25)
3-10-69 Plaintiff filed notice of hearing of their
pending motions (R. 27)
3-18-69 Order of dismissal by court (R. 29)

No action was taken by either party for 51;2 years after
filing of complaint, answer and counterclaim and motion
to strike. After 5% years Defendant requested that the
case be set for trial by filing a notice of readiness for
trial (R.28). Plaintiff then filed an objection (R. 22) but
has never called its objection up for hearing. Two months
later Plaintiff filed additional motions and called them
up for hearing (R. 24, 25, 27). Neither party made a
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and each party
was proceeding to a determination of the issues on the
merits when the Court, at the time set for hearing those
motions without notice to either party, with the consent
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of Plaintiff and over the objections of Defendants, ordered the complaint and counterclaim dismissed for
failure to prosecute (R. 29).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION.
The sole issue to be determined by this appeal is
whether the Court erred in dismissing the counterclaim
under the circumstances.
(a) Plaintiff's motion in open court to dismiss its
complaint and Defendants' counterclaim did not authorize court to dismiss the counterclaim.

Plaintiff's motion in open court for the dismissal of
Plaintiff's complaint (R. 29), after the court had indicated that it was going to dismiss the action for failure to
prosecute, did not authorize the Court to dismiss the
action because a counterclaim had been filed and Defendants did not consent. The only circumstance under which
Plaintiff's complaint could be dismissed on Plaintiffs
tion would be when, as stated in the rule, the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication
by the court. The Court could properly dismiss Plaintiff's
complaint only if the counterclaim were not dismissed.
Rule 41 (a) (1) and (2), URCP; Watson v. White, case
No. 11321 filed June 18, 1969,
U (2d) _ _
P. 2d _ _
(b) Rule 41 authorizes the Court to dismiss a count.:.
erclaim on motion of the Plaintiff only if counter-
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claim may remain pending for independent adjudication.
Rule 41 ( b), URCP specifies the circumstances under
which an action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute,
which rule reads in part as follows:
Rule 41(b) INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: EFFECT
THEREOF.

For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute ... a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any
claim against him . . . . "
Rule 41 (a) and (b) is made applicable to counterclaims
by Rule 41 ( c), URCP. See also Crystal Lime & Cement
v. Golden W. Robbins, et al., 8 U (2d) 389, 335 P.2d 624.
The Court is not authorized by rule 41 to dismiss an
action on its own motion, but only on motion by the defendant. In Watson v. White, Supra the Utah Supreme
Court reversed an order of the Fifth District Court dismissing a complaint and an answer and counterclaim
filed 5 2/3 years later. In that case no action whatever
was taken by the Defendant in that action until 5 2/3
years after the action had been commenced, which is a
period slightly in excess of the dormant period involved
in this action. The Court in that case construed the phrase
contained in Rule 41 (a) (2), URCP which states that the
dismissal may only be had "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper" to mean that a dismissal cannot be granted unless the defendants are protected by permitting their counterclaim to remain for
independent adjudication. The Court in that case, as in
our case, did not have a discretion to exercise under the
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terms of that rule which permitted it to order the dismissal of the counterclaim, reversed the order of dismissal
and remanded the case for further proceedings by the
lower court. This case seems to fall squarely within the
rule established by that decision that no discretion existed
in favor of the Court to dismiss the counterclaim. See
also Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure,
Vol 2B quoted with approval by the Court in that case.
( c) Dismissal for failure to prosecute is not authorized where a counterclaim has been filed and both
parties had the power to take action to obtain relief
themselves.
Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Golden W. Robbins,
supra, which, as in our case, involved a counterclaim and
therefore subjected both parties to the penalty of dismissal of their action for failure to prosecute. This Court
ruled that it was error for the district court to dismiss the
action with prejudice as to a party who failed to take
action for 8 years since both plaintiff and defendant had
the power to obtain relief following a decree of the Supreme Court. In our case the delay was 21/2 years less
than that in the Crystal Lime & Cement v. Robbins, supra,
case, and as in that case either the plaintiff or defendant
could have called Plaintiff's motion up for hearing by
mailing of notice to the other party. In that case the Court
stated
"Since any party to this action could have obtained
the relief to which it was entitled at any time it had
wanted but both parties chose to dally for a number
of years, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to
grant respondents' motion to dismiss with prejudice."
(Emphasis added).
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(d) A party is not harassed or annoyed by failure to

prosecute when it had power at all times to take action to obtain relief themselves.
A reason generally advanced for dismissal of an action
for failure to prosecute is that to permit the case to remain pending indefinitely would result in undue harrassment and annoyance of the defendant. 24 Am Jur 2d
50, Sec. 59; Barron & Holtzoff, Vol. 2B, page 139, Sec. 918.
That rule is not applicable however where the parties
are equally at fault. Barron & Holtzoff, Vol. 2B, page 144,
Sec. 918 footnote 13; 24 Am. Jur. 2d 57, Sec. 66, footnote
3; In Crystal Lime and Cement Co. v. Robbins, Supra,
the Utah Supreme Court expressly adopted this exception to the general rule permitting dismissal for failure
to prosecute by the following ruling in that case:
"It can, therefore, hardly be reasonably argued that
they were harassed and annoyed by appellant's action
in failing to draw and present to the court findings
of fact, conclusions of law and decree embodying the
decision of the court granting them the amounts they
claim when they had it in their power at all times to
obtain relief by themselves presenting such findings
and decree to the court for signing." (emphasis
added)
In Wright v. Howe, 46 U. 588, 150 P. 956 the Utah Supreme Court held that in the absence of showing of any
prejudice, a defendant who had the same right as the
plaintiff to press the action to trial, but who permitted it
to remain pending for about three years could not complain of the overruling of their motion to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute.
In Lyon v. State, 283 P.2d 1105, 76 Idaho 374, the Court
refused to dismiss where the plaintiff moved for the
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cause to be reinstated after it had been inactive for over
eleven years in which case it did not appear that the
defendants had lost any rights, or had been prejudiced
by the delay, or that plaintiffs had unreservedly abandoned the action, delay in prosecution alone not entitling
the defendants to summary dismissal over objection.
The record in our case fails to show that the plaintiff
has lost any rights or has been prejudiced by the delay
in prosecution of this action, and the filing of the notice
of readiness for trial by Defendants two months before
the first action was taken by the court to dismiss for
failure to prosecute, clearly shows that the Defendants
had not abandoned their counterclaim.
In our case the Plaintiff at all times had it within its
power to obtain relief by simply noticing up their own
motion for hearing.
( e) Earlier de lay does not justify dismissal when
party is prosecuting action with diligence at time of
dismissal.
In our case the parties had resumed active prosecution
of the case some two months prior to the first indication
by the Court that the case should be dismissed for failure
to prosecute. An action cannot be dismissed at a time
when the parties are prosecuting the case with diligence
because at some earlier time the plaintiff failed to act
with diligence. Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Vol. 2B, Page 140, Sec. 918; Rollins v. U. S.,
C.A.9th, 1961, 286 F. 2d 761; 24 Am. Jur. 51, Sec. 59;
Ayers v. D. F. Quillen & Sons, Inc., (Del. Sup) 188 A2d
510;
(f) Drastic remedy

of dismissal with prejudice
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should be applied only in extreme cases.
Dismissal of an action with prejudice is a drastic remedy which should be applied only in extreme cases, and
in final analysis the court has the responsibility of doing 1
justice and general principles cannot justify denial of
party's fair day in court except on serious showing of
willful fault. Mely v. Morris, (Alaska), 409 P.2d 979;
Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 283 F.2d 730,
733 (2d Cir. 1960); Producers Releasing Corp. De Cuba '
v. PRC Pictures, 2 Cir., 1949, 176 F.2d 93, 96; Gill v.
Stolow, 2 Cir, 1957, 240 W.2d 669, 670; 2B Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 917, at 136.
SUMMARY
The Court abused its discretion by dismissing Defendants' counterclaim on its own motion, over their objec·
tions for failure to prosecute where, although case had
been dormant for 5% years. Defendant had 21/2 months
earlier filed a notice of readiness for trial asking that the
case be set for trial. Where both parties had equal power
to call Plaintiff's pending motion up for hearing, Plaintiff
filed no motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and
there is no showing that Plaintiff lost any right or had
been prejudiced by the delay, and the long pending motions had been called up for hearing by the parties and
were about to be heard by the Court when the Court
ordered the case dismissed without notice to the parties. ,
Rule 41 pertaining to dismissal of actions does not authorize this dismissal.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. BARKER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellants

